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Abstract
Financial deregulation since the 1980s has been stimulating fierce 
competition among banks and influencing financial stability 
across the world. In pace with this, Bangladesh’s banking industry 
is also experiencing intense competition since it is composed 
of many banks. The empirical evidence on competition and 
stability widely debate to date, perhaps for not considering the 
potential nonlinearity. Therefore, our study aims to explore the 
nonlinear impact of competition on the financial stability of 
Bangladeshi banks over 2010-2017. For achieving this objective, 
we compute the Boone indicator and Z-score using bank-level 
data to measure competition and stability, respectively, and 
examine the nonlinear dynamics of competition-stability nexus 
employing threshold analysis in a panel setup. Our findings 
confirm that the competition-stability relationship is nonlinear 
and implies that financial stability is more substantial (weaker) 
in a less (more) competitive market. Our results bear specific 
policy implications.
Keywords:





Received: 12 June 2020 
Revised: 04 September 2020
Accepted: 10 September 2020





The liberalization of the financial system and reforms of banking industries across 
the borders have altered the functional and competitive atmosphere for banks. Inline, 
Bangladesh is also experiencing an escalating new-entries in the flourishing banking 
industry. Banks in the fast-growing and emerging economies like Bangladesh exist at the 
top of the financial system with immense importance. Because of having a less developed 
capital market, Bangladesh mostly relies on banks to finance its economic growth and 
development. Higher demands for banks in developing and transitional economies may 
cause intense competition in the banking industry. 
The empirical investigations show that intense competition may either entice 
banks to take excessive risks and cause financial debris (Allen & Gale, 2004; Carletti 
& Hartmann, 2002; Jimenez, Lopez, & Surina, 2013), or may bring efficiency through 
reducing costs and price of the financial service and motivate banks to maintain a 
buffer capital that ensures financial stability (Pruteanu-Podpiera, Weill, & Schobert, 2008; 
Schaeck, Cihak, & Wolfe, 2009; Schaeck & Cihák, 2014; Clark, Radić, & Sharipova, 
2018). Moreover, some research findings exemplify inconclusive relationship between 
competition and stability (Allen & Gale, 2004; Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 2009; 
Saif-Alyousfi, Saha, & Md-Rus, 2020). 
These theoretical and empirical literature on financial stability and competition 
show ambiguous as well as debated conclusions and lead to two different views endorsing 
the ideas of financial fragility and financial stability. The competition-fragility view, first 
proposed by Keeley (1990), argues that higher bank competition increases bank’s risk-
taking incentives, because excessive competition erodes the franchise value of banks by 
reducing their monopoly rents and hence to survive in competition, banks will engage 
in more risky activities for example, by disbursing loans to borrowers without proper 
screening. Therefore, extreme competition is alleged for the failure of the US and the 
UK financial sectors (Llewellyn, 2007; Milne, 2009). A more recent study by Beck, 
Jonghe, and Schepens, (2013) claims that in an economy with a developed and strictly 
regulated financial framework, competition and banking fragility are positively related, 
and variation of regulation can change the intensity of this relationship.
Alternatively, the competition-stability view argues that in a competitive environment, 
banks are found to maintain a buffer capital that decreases the propensity of the financial 
crisis (Schaecket al., 2009). In less competitive market banks tends to charge higher 
rates on loan to increase profitability, which may raise the risk of bankruptcy (Boyd 
& De Nicoló, 2005), whereas in a competitive market lower rate charged by banks 
motivates borrowers to invest in less risky projects and makes the lending safe, albeit lower 
revenue from low rate can make the banks vulnerable, which makes the competition-risk 
relationship U-shaped (Martinez-Miera & Repullo, 2010)
To further examine the interaction of banking soundness and competition, Schaeck 
and Cihák (2014) has analyzed 3600 banks from ten European countries and more than 
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Kasman and Kasman, (2015) found the opposite relation while analyzing Turkish banking 
industry.
The mixed findings of Berger et al. (2009) and Saif-Alyousfi, et al. (2020) make 
this mysterious relationship even more interesting by supporting both the stability and 
fragility view. They find strong positive and negative relation of market power with loan 
portfolio risk and overall exposure, respectively, and suggest that their coexistence can 
influence stability or fragility at the same time. Moreover, a recent paper of Saha and 
Dutta (2020) find that competition contributes to stability; however, there is evidence 
of fragility in the presence of concentration in the banking industry.
The reason behind these debated and mixed results might be the non-linearity of 
the relationship between competition and stability, as most of the aforementioned studies 
assume a linear relationship between them. Though the theoretical paper of Martinez-
Miera and Repullo (2010) suggested a U-shaped relationship between competition and 
stability, it is not properly addressed in the literature yet. Only the study of Jimenez 
et al. (2013) investigate whether a non-linear relationship between concentration and 
stability exists in the Spanish banking system; albeit, concentration is a very delicate proxy 
of competition (Claessens & Laeven, 2004) and could generate a spurious, misleading 
and suboptimal findings. Besides, lesser concentration does not necessarily mean higher 
competition, since Berger et al. (2009) suggest that concentration and competition could 
coexist and can simultaneously induce stability or fragility. Therefore it is imperative to 
further investigate the nonlinearity of this nexus.
To the best of our knowledge, no study to date has investigated the nonlinearity 
of the nexus between competition and stability considering an erudite measure of the 
former, especially in a transitional economy setup. Therefore, considering the debated 
competition-stability nexus and the empirical gap to explore the no-linearity between 
them, we investigate this relationship in the context of a transitional economy like 
Bangladesh using bank-level data of 30 listed banks over 2009-2017. 
For this investigation we compute and use Z-score and Boone indicator to measure 
bank stability and competition, respectively and apply fixed effect panel threshold model 
(Hansen, 1999) to investigate whether a certain level of competition is critical to achieve 
stability or to identify the optimum competition from which the stability tends become 
weaker. To check the robustness of our estimations, we construct and use an alternative 
Boone indicator. Furthermore, to address the endogeneity, we apply the threshold model 
introduced by Seo and Shin (2016). The results of our study indicate that though 
competition contributes to stability; however, the impact becomes moderated at higher 
level of competition.
Our findings contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we calculate 
the Boone indicator and Z-score and portray the most comprehensive scenario related to 
the competition and stability of all the listed banks of Bangladesh. Second, our study 
contribute to identify the optimum level of competition to maintain and foster financial 
stability by analyzing the nonlinear relationship between competition and stability, which is 




still an under-researched area of financial economics. Finally by addressing the endogeneity 
issues and generating reliable results using a relatively advanced model of threshold 
analysis (Seo & Shin, 2016), our study also support the policy formulation to ensure 
the banking stability of a country. Moreover, as our study is based on a fast-growing 
emerging economy, Bangladesh, which is characterized as a bank dependent financial 
system, therefore the research approach and robust findings of this study can be applied 
for other emerging countries to uphold sustainable competition in the financial market, 
and thus, ensure the economic stability of the nation. 
Methods
To analyze the nonlinear relationship between bank competition and stability, bank-
level data of competition, financial stability, and control variables- bank size, liquidity, and 
asset growth rate are hand collected from annual reports of the concerned banks. Our 
sample consists of all the banks listed in the stock exchange. At present, there are fifty-
four commercial banks in Bangladesh, among which thirty banks are listed in the stock 
exchange.
In addition, country-level control variables- GDP growth rate and financial depth 
are collected from World Development Indicator (World Bank, 2019) for the periods 
2009-2017, which constitute a balanced panel of 270 observations. Prior to the analysis, 
all data are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to reduce the influence of outliers.
To measure financial stability a wide range of indicators were devised following the 
global financial crises of 1980s and 1990s, like, Z-score, probability of bankruptcy, standard 
deviation of ROA, non-performing loan ratio and so on, among which Z-score is very 
common and used by many researchers (Amidu & Wolfe, 2013; Fu, Lin, & Molyneux, 
2014; Kasman & Kasman, 2015; Beck, et al., 2013; Morgan & Pontines, 2014; Saha & 
Dutta, 2020). Z-score measures the insolvency risk of a bank; a higher value indicates a 
lesser risk of bankruptcy and higher bank stability. We calculate Z-score as follows:
                  (1)
where ROA is the return on assets, E/TA represents the equity to total assets ratio, and 
σROA denotes the standard deviation of return on assets. We use three-year rolling time 
windows to compute the standard deviation of ROA to allow for time variation in the 
denominator of the Z-score. 
To determine competition H-statistic, concentration ratios, Lerner index, Boone 
indicator, and other measures could be used. Structural measures like HHI (Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index) and bank-concentration ratio represent competition through level of 
concentration, which is found as a delicate proxy of competition (Claessens & Laeven, 
2004), and thus, could generate misleading outcomes. Moreover, a high degree of industry 





Volume 20 (1), 2021: 55 - 66
2018). On the other hand, Lerner index is also criticized for not being able to confine 
the degree of product substitutability (Vives, 2008). Whereas Boone indicator, introduced 
by Boone (2001, 2008) is found to overcome these shortcomings and is employed by 
some researchers like Schaeck and Cihák (2014), Saif-Alyousfi et al. (2020), Kasman 
& Kasman (2015), Saha & Dutta (2020). Following the relevance, this study also uses 
the Boone indicator to measure the competition. Boone (2008) calculates the level of 
competition by estimating the elasticity of firm performance, in terms of its market 
shares, with respect to its marginal costs, as follows:
      (2)
where the coefficient β denotes the Boone indicator. To ensure the robustness of the 
estimation, we use market share of total loan (hereafter, Boone-loan) as well as market 
share of total deposits (hereafter, Boone-deposit) respectively to estimate Boone indicator. 
In principle Boone indicator argues that competition creates a negative relation between 
performance and marginal cost that becomes stronger at higher level of competition. 
Following Schaeck & Cihák (2014), we approximate the marginal costs by calculating 
the average variable costs as marginal costs cannot be observed directly.
To control the bank-specific heterogeneity and economic condition, we use different 
control variables. Similar to Jeon and Kim (2013), loan to deposit is used to control 
the liquidity, a higher value of which signifies lower liquidity. The log of total asset is 
used to control bank size, which is also used by Kasman and Kasman (2015) and Jeon 
and Kim (2013). To account for the business growth, asset growth rate is also used 
as a control variable. Furthermore, GDP growth rate (gGDP) and broad money as a 
percentage of GDP are used to control the fluctuations of economic activity and financial 
depth. Description and sources of all variables used are presented in appendix Table-A1.
To explore potential non-linearity in the effect of Competition on Bank stability 
we use the following fixed effect non-dynamic panel threshold model as developed by 
Hansen (1999). 
     (3)
where FSit is the financial stability, Xit is the regime dependent variable and Zit is a set 
of regime independent variables, ui is the country fixed effect and ℇit is iid residual with 
mean zero and finite variance. The observations are divided into two ‘regimes’ depending 
on whether the threshold variable qit is smaller or greater than the threshold γ. The 
regimes are distinguished by the different regression slopes, β1 and β2. The hypothesis 
of no threshold effect can be represented by the linear constraint H0: β1 = β2. Hansen 
(1999) suggests a likelihood ratio statistic (LR) under the null of no threshold effect, 
with p-values computed via bootstrap analog suggested by Hansen (1996) which shows 
that this bootstrap analog produces asymptotically correct p-value. Hansen (1999) suggests 
that the method can be extended in a straightforward manner to higher order thresholds 
models. To explore whether there is a threshold in the impact of competition on financial 
stability, we use competition as both the regime dependent variable and threshold variable.





Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the data used in this study. The mean 
value and standard deviation of the Z-score are 32.88 and 26.343, respectively, showing 
an overall stable state; however, the minimum value 1.336, represents some banks are 
susceptible to financial distress. The minimum values of -0.31and -0.11, the maximum 
values of 0.036 and 0.07 and the mean values of 0.033 and 0.34 associated with the 
Boone-loan and Boone-deposit, respectively show a high level of competition in banking 
industry. The standard deviation of loan to deposit ratio (1.732) and financial depth 
(3.396) indicate high variations of liquidity across banks and financial development over 
years. All other variables show moderate variation. To facilitate comparability among 
variables and simplify the interpretation of our results, we standardized all variables as 
it creates a unit less measure. Cross-section variation of Z-score and Boone indicators 
are presented in the appendix Table-A2
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Z-score 270 32.88 26.343 1.336 153.944
Boone-loan 270 0.033 0.001 -0.031 0.036
Boone-deposit 270 0.034 0.017 -0.011 0.07
log (total asset) 270 25.672 0.698 23.19 27.31
Asset growth 270 0.295 1.15 -0.961 14.451
Loan to deposit ratio 270 1.163 1.732 0.394 21.173
gGDP 270 6.292 0.669 5.045 7.284
Financial depth 270 61.662 3.396 54.882 65.848
Table-2 represents the result of the fixed effect panel threshold analysis of equation 
(3). We use Boone-loan and Boone-deposit as a measure of competition in models 1 
and 2, respectively. The significant level of threshold is 1.7846 for both models. As 
higher negative value of the Boone indicator signifies higher competition, therefore the 
Boone indicator higher than and equal to the threshold value (≥1.7846) implies lesser 
competition and the Boone indicator less than the threshold value ((<1.7846) highlights 
higher competition. 
In both regimes (higher and lower competition) of both models, competition 
contributes to financial stability; however, the coefficient is higher in the second regime 
(lower competition), which signifies financial stability is stronger in lesser competition 
and vice-versa. This finding can be explained as competition increases efficiency, reduce 
the lending rate of banks, and thus reduce the moral hazard of the borrowers, which 
contributes to financial stability. Nevertheless, at the higher competition, the market 
power, as well as the earning decreases, and/ or banks may take more risks to maintain 
the market share by disbursing loans to borrowers without proper screening, which may 
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(optimum) level, these results support the competition-stability hypothesis like Schaeck, 
Cihak, & Wolfe, 2009, Schaeck & Cihák, 2014 and Clark et al., 2018; nevertheless, 
intense competition, higher than the optimum level, moderates financial stability. Among 
different control variables, bank size has a significant negative impact on stability which 
implies larger bank may increase risk and/or the operation cost, and thus, hampers 
stability. Whereas, financial depth has a significant positive impact on stability, signifying 
financial depth contribute to increase the resilience of financial system.
Table 2. Panel Threshold Analysis
Variables (1) (2)
Threshold estimates 1.7846 1.7846
95% confidence interval [1.6586, 1.7787] [1.6346, 1.8133]











log (total asset) -0.436*** -0.437***
(0.121) (0.122)
Asset growth -0.053 -0.052
(0.057) (0.057)










Number of Banks 30 30
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The panel threshold analysis developed by Hansen (1999) has a limitation as it 
assumes that all variables in the model are strictly exogenous. Therefore, the estimation 




using the Hansen (1999) model may not be consistent as there is a possibility of reverse 
causality in our model. The stability of the banking industry may attract more new banks 
or exiting banks to open new branches to increase the market share. Besides, there can 
be unobserved heterogeneity among banks in our sample. 
Therefore to address the endogeneity issues, we apply an extended model with a 
potentially endogenous threshold variable developed by Seo and Shin (2016). We assume 
the threshold variable Boone indicator as the endogenous variable and market share of 
deposit as the instrument variable. We choose the market share of deposit as an instrument 
variable because it is strongly correlated with Boone Indicator, without having a direct 
influence on bank stability. Moreover, Schaeck and Cihák (2014) use the same variable 
as an instrument for the Boone indicator. As GDP growth rate and financial depth are 
country-level variables, therefore they are assumed to be exogenous in our model. 
Table 3. Panel Threshold Analysis Considering Endogeneity





log (total asset) -0.500*** -0.833
(0.053) (1.318)
Asset growth 0.111*** -5.630**
(0.026) (2.373)











Number of Banks 30
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The results are presented in Table-3. Similar to the results of the Hansen (1999) panel 
regression (Table-2), the coefficient of the Boone indicator is negative and significant in 
both regimes; however, the coefficient is higher in lower competition regime, which signifies 
financial stability is moderated at the higher competition and vice-versa. Consistent with 
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positive; however, only significant in higher competition regime. These results imply bank 
size increases risk at the higher competition and financial depth strengthens the stability 
at the higher level of competition. GDP growth has a significant positive effect, whereas 
loan to deposit ratios have a significant negative effect in lower competition, signifying 
higher economic growth and liquidity contribute to stability at the lower competition. 
Asset growth is significantly positive and significantly negative at the higher and lower 
level of competition, respectively. 
Conclusion
Since the deregulation of the financial sector, competition in the banking industry 
around the world has been escalating continuously, and the financial ecosystem is evolving 
along with new challenges. Against this backdrop, impact of competition on financial 
stability has become a prime concern among policy-circles and researchers, and an extensive 
number of studies have been conducted in this area; nevertheless, a consensus is yet to 
achieve. Besides, the research initiative to explore the nonlinear impact of competition 
on financial stability is still very scant. Therefore to contribute to this field of study and 
to fill the empirical gap of exploring the nonlinearity of competition-stability nexus, we 
studied the banking industry of Bangladesh based on a sample of 30 listed commercial 
banks for the period 2009-2017. To attain our research objectives, we use bank-level data 
and calculate the Z-score, Boone indicator (for both deposit and loan market) to measure 
the stability and competition, respectively, of the selected banks. We employ the Hansen 
(1999) panel threshold model to identify the optimum level of competition and analyze 
the heterogeneous impact of competition at different regimes identified by the threshold.
The findings of our threshold analysis show that the competition-stability nexus is 
nonlinear. Moreover, though in both regimes, below or above the threshold, competition 
contributes to the financial stability; however, the coefficient is higher in the lower regime 
of competition. Therefore our results signify that financial stability is stronger (weaker) 
in a less (more) competitive market.
Our empirical findings contribute to the debate regarding the relationship between 
competition and stability and have some significant policy implications. According to 
our results a healthy competition is essential for the stability in emerging economies. 
Optimum level of competition helps foster financial stability, though beyond the certain 
threshold it moderates the stability. This fresh insight concerning the moderating role 
of intense competition from an emerging market perspective will assist policymakers to 
formulate appropriate policies for endorsing financial stability. Though it is argued that 
competition in the financial market supports the financial inclusion, financial efficiency 
and financial development; however, fierce competition may erode the development gain 
through curbing the stability of financial sectors. Therefore regulators should consider the 
threshold level of competitiveness to regulate new entrants into the financial sector and 
encourage healthy competition among financial institutions as competition incentivizes 
the financial system to improve cost-effectiveness and reallocates revenues from inefficient 
units to successful and efficient ones.
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Table A1: Sources and measurements of variables
Variables Description/ Measurement Source
Dependent Variable




ln(Market share)it = α + β ln(Marginal cost)it
Author’s calculation
Control Variables
Bank size log(Total asset) Financial statement
Liquidity Loan to deposit ratio Author’s calculation
Bank growth Asset growth rate Author’s calculation
Economic growth (gGDP) Growth of GDP WDI, WB
Financial depth Broad money to GDP WDI, WB
Table A2: Cross-section variation of Z-score and Boone indicator
Bank Name Z-score Boone-loan Boone-deposit
AB Bank Limited 43.56987 0.468585 0.468585
Al-Arafah Islami Bank Ltd. 28.19283 -0.4547 -0.4547
Bank Asia Limited 44.2354 0.141181 0.141181
Brac Bank Limited 34.05192 1.23933 1.23933
City Bank Limited 16.46487 0.510534 0.510534
Dhaka Bank Limited 21.43155 -0.20853 -0.20853
Dutch-Bangla Bank Limited 26.65651 0.894948 0.894947
EXIM Bank Limited 24.73169 -0.14653 -0.14653
Eastern Bank Limited 36.79347 0.121552 0.121552
First Security Islami Bank Ltd. 40.25451 -0.72097 -0.72097
ICB Islami Bank Limited 22.15171 -2.27247 -2.27247
IFIC Bank Limited 15.55053 0.192848 0.192848
Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd. 59.32566 1.628667 1.628668
Jamuna Bank Limited 16.98542 -0.31268 -0.31268
Mercantile Bank Limited 24.47242 0.027591 0.027592
Mutual Trust Bank Limited 38.45659 -0.41865 -0.41865
National Bank Limited 18.93471 0.828017 0.828016
National Credit & 45.20552 -0.43368 -0.43368
Commerce Bank Ltd. 45.20552 -0.43368 -0.43368
One Bank Limited 19.14979 -0.40755 -0.40756
Premier Bank Limited 40.39299 -0.18908 -0.18908
Prime Bank Limited 41.21711 0.673823 0.673824
Pubali Bank Limited 23.75729 0.767971 0.767971
Rupali Bank Limited 33.74252 0.197702 0.197702
Shahjalal Islami Bank Limited 21.27317 -0.69738 -0.69739
Social Islami Bank Limited 80.687 -0.65233 -0.65233
Southeast Bank Limited 28.02343 -0.20343 -0.20343
Standard Bank Limited 33.3699 -1.0092 -1.0092
Trust Bank Limited 21.46717 -0.55536 -0.55536
United Commercial Bank Limited 26.40746 0.583471 0.583472
Uttara Bank Limited 59.44604 0.406344 0.406343
